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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . After the debtor
defaulted on a loan secured by farm land, the debtor
attempted to avert foreclosure by selling a portion of the
land. A creditor with a junior mortgage on the property
refused to release the lien for the sale unless a portion of the
proceeds was paid on a debt for seed. The first mortgagee
refused to allow this payment and the property was sold to
the junior creditor who obtained a loan for the purchase
from the creditor with the first mortgage on the property.
The debtor sought to avoid the foreclosure sale as a
fraudulent transfer because (1) the price was unreasonably
below the fair market value, (2) the sale was collusive, and
(3) the sale was not conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner. The court held that the sale was not
fraudulent because the price received was the “reasonably
equivalent value” since no evidence was presented of
collusion or impropriety in the manner of sale. The court
also held that the first mortgage holder breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in refusing
to allow a portion of the proceeds to be paid to the second
mortgage holder where the sale price exceeded the fair
market value of the property and the expected proceeds of a
foreclosure sale. The court found that, given the benefit the
creditor would have received from the private sale, the
refusal indicated a motive to harm the debtor. In re
Bennett, 154 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1992).
DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6].* The debtor was an
officer in a grain dealer corporation which was also in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Illinois Department of
Agriculture (IDA) filed a claim against the grain dealer’s
estate for funds the IDA was required to pay to grain
producers to cover amounts owed by the grain dealer. The
Chapter 7 trustee brought suit against the debtor for these
claims and to have the claims held nondischargeable under
Sections 523(a)(2), (4), (6) for (1) obtaining property by
fraud, (2) breach of fidcuciary capacity, and (3) willful and
malicious injury to the claimants. The court held that the
trustee had no standing to bring such actions for the benefit
of specific creditors. In re Martin, 154 B.R. 490 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption which was allowed because no creditor timely
objected to the exemption. The debtor had received a
discharge under Chapter 7 and sought avoidance of
judgment liens as impairing the homestead exemption. The
court allowed the post-discharge avoidance of the judgment
liens because the creditors failed to show any prejudice or
harm from the delay in seeking the avoidance. In re
Jacobs, 154 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor’s homestead was sold
during the bankruptcy case and the debtor claimed a
homestead exemption under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 794.710
in the proceeds. The court held that the exemption in the
proceeds was not available to a sale of a homestead in a
bankruptcy case because the exemption for proceeds was
limited by the statute only to sales of homesteads to enforce
money judgments. In re Pladson, 154 B.R. 305 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
The debtor leased a residence from a public
governmental unit for 99 years and claimed a homestead
exemption for the leasehold interest. The court held that a
leasehold interest in a residence was eligible for the Florida
homestead exemption. In re McAtee, 154 B.R. 346
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1993).
The debtor sought to avoid a judgment lien as impairing
the debtor’s homestead exemption. The debtor owned the
house with the debtor’s nondebtor spouse as tenants by the
entireties. The court held that the judgment lien was not
avoidable because the lien did not impair the debtor’s
possessory interest in the residence. In re Arango, 992
F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 136 B.R. 740 (E.D. Tenn.
1992).
IRA. The debtor sought to exclude the debtor’s interest
in an IRA either under Section 541(c)(2) or as an
exemption under Section 522(d)(10)(E). The debtor argued
that the IRA was excluded from estate property because
I.R.C. § 72(t) was a federal nonbankruptcy restriction on
the transfer of funds in the IRA. The court held that the IRA
was estate property because I.R.C. § 72(t) did not restrict
transfers but only placed a surcharge upon early
withdrawals. The court also held that the IRA was not
eligible for an exemption because the debtor was not
currently receiving payments from the account nor was the
account reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor.
In re Brewer, 154 B.R. 209 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12
JURY TRIAL. The debtor and trustee commenced
adversary proceedings against several creditors for usury,
preferential transfers, tortious interference with contract,
and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act. The court held that the plaintiffs were
allowed a jury trial on these issues. In re Bennett, 154 B.R.
126 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1992).
    CHAPTER 13   
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[3][c].* The debtors sought to have
a mortgage claim against their residence bifurcated into
secured and unsecured claims for purposes of payments
under the Chapter 13 plan. The court held that Section
1322(b)(2) prohibits the modification of secured claims
against the debtor’s residence, including bifurcation into
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secured and unsecured claims. Nobelman v. American
Savings Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993), aff’g, 968 F.2d 483
(5th Cir. 1992), aff’g, 129 B.R. 98 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
The Chapter 13 debtor’s plan provided for payment of
arrearages on a loan secured by the debtor’s residence;
however, the plan did not provide for any interest payments
on the arrearages. The loan mortgage did not contain any
provision for payment of interest on arrearages. The value
of the property exceeded the total amount due on the loan.
The court held that the creditor was entitled to
preconfirmation and postconfirmation interest on the
arrearages. Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct. 2187 (1993), aff’g,
968 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1992).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
ABANDONMENT-ALM § 13.03[7].* The debtor’s
Chapter 7 estate included a residence which had a fair
market value in excess of the debtor’s federal income tax
basis. Because the debtor had no equity in the property, the
trustee abandoned the property during the estate
administration, without objection by the debtor.  After the
sale of the property, the debtor was faced with substantial
taxable gain and the debtor sought to have the bankruptcy
estate made liable for the taxable gain. The court held that
the trustee’s abandonment was not a taxable event and that
abandonment resulted in return of the property to the
debtor, making the debtor liable for any taxable gain from
the sale of the property. In re Terjen, 154 B.R. 456 (E.D.
Va. 1993).
CLAIMS. The debtor sought a determination of the
value of the debtor’s residence for purposes of determining
the secured portion of a federal tax claim. The court held
that the debtor could not deduct the hypothetical costs of a
sale from the fair market value, where the debtor intended
to remain in the residence. In re Coby, 154 B.R. 316
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1993), on recon. of, 109 B.R. 963
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1990)..
DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6].* The debtor’s tax
liability for 1981 through 1988 was nondischargeable
because the debtor did not file a tax return for these years
until less than two years before the date of the bankruptcy
petition. The court also held that the interest on those taxes
was also nondischargeable, but that the penalties assessed
were dischargeable to the extent the penalties resulted from
actions occurring more than three years before the date of
the petition. In re Olson, 154 B.R. 276 (Bankr. D. N.D.
1993).
The debtor sought abatement or discharge of a penalty
for failure to pay taxes when due.  The IRS had agreed to
abate one-half of the penalty but the debtor sought complete
abatement. The debtor alleged that the payment of the tax
when due would have created a financial hardship and that
the tax was unexpected due to a change in the tax laws. The
court found that the debtor had sufficient funds to pay the
taxes but instead voluntarily choose to make a charitable
contribution and to turnover some of the funds to the
bankruptcy trustee; therefore, an abatement was not allowed
under I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2). The court also held that the
penalty was nondischargeable because the underlying taxes
were nondischargeable. In re Hallock, 154 B.R. 297
(Bankr. D. Ark. 1993).
POST-PETITION INTEREST. The debtors filed a
Chapter 13 case and their plan was confirmed. Prior to
completion of plan payments, the IRS filed an amended
claim substantially increasing the tax claim. The debtors
dismissed their case and refiled for Chapter 13 in an
attempt to increase the time for payment of the larger tax
claim. The IRS filed a claim in the second case for the
amended tax claim plus interest and penalties for the period
from the date of the first petition to the date of the second
petition. The court held that, upon dismissal of a case, the
IRS was allowed to reinstate any interest and penalties
abated by the filing of the petition. In re Whitmore, 154
B.R. 314 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1993).
CONTRACTS
CONSIDERATION. The debtor was indebted to a first
mortgage holder and the defendant, a junior judgement lien
holder. In order to avoid foreclosure on the debtor’s farm
land, the debtor sought a private sale of a portion of the
land and the release of the liens. The defendant first agreed
to release its lien but when the debtor failed to pay for some
fertilizer purchased from the defendant, the defendant
reneged on the agreement and refused to release its lien
unless the fertilizer was paid for from the proceeds of the
sale. The first lien holder refused to accept less than all of
the proceeds and the farm was eventually sold by
foreclosure. The debtor sued the defendant for breach of the
contract to release the lien. The defendant argued that the
agreement to release the lien was not a valid contract
because it received no consideration for the promise. The
debtor argued that the defendant would have received value
in that the payment on the first lien would have improved
the defendant’s secured position with the remaining
collateral. Both the trial and appellate courts held that the
defendant did not receive consideration for the promise
because the debtor’s pre-existing obligation remained the
same before and after the promise. In re Bennett, 154 B.R.
126 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 154 B.R. 157 (N.D.
N.Y. 1992).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ANIMAL IMPORTS. The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations governing the costs and applications for the
lottery for use of the Harry S. Truman Animal Import
Center by importer, effective with the lottery for 1994. 58
Fed. Reg. 37878 (July 14, 1993).
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2][g].* The
Farm Credit Administration has issued proposed
regulations which amend the borrower’s rights notices to
remove a reference to foreclosure when notifying borrowers
that their distressed loans may be suitable for restructuring.
58 Fed. Reg. 38091 (July 15, 1993).
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations requiring Class Free states to conduct enough
brucellosis ring tests to ensure that every commercial dairy
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herd is tested at least twice a year at approximately 6 month
intervals. 58 Fed. Reg. 37665 (July 13, 1993).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The FCIC has
issued proposed regulations which (1) expand the range of
sanctions for fraud, misrepresentation, false claims and
other violations of contracts for insurance and (2) prescribe
the terms and conditions under which persons may be
suspended or debarred from contracting for insurance from
the FCIC. 58 Fed. Reg. 37874 (July 14, 1993).
CROP LOANS. The CCC has issued proposed
regulations establishing a method for calculating the
prevailing world price of soybeans and oilseeds and
establishing a mechanism for periodically announcing the
adjusted world price for each oilseed. 58 Fed. Reg. 38311
(July 16, 1993).
FARMER OWNED RESERVE. The CCC has
adopted as final amendments to the regulations governing
the farmer-owned reserve program in which it was
established that 900 million bushels of the 1992 crop of
corn, grain sorghum and barley may be pledged as
collateral for program loans. 58 Fed. Reg. 38509 (July 19,
1993).
MIGRANT AND SEASONAL LABOR-ALM §
3.04.* The plaintiffs were migrant seasonal agricultural
labors who harvested asparagus for the defendant.
Although the defendant had agreed at the beginning of the
season to pay the workers 11 cents per cut pound, the
defendant changed the pay to 11 cents per paid pound (the
amount paid after accounting for waste). When the
defendant refused to pay the amount originally agreed to,
the plaintiffs sought recovery of the wages. The court found
that the defendant had (1) failed to make written disclosure
of the terms of employment, (2) failed to keep required
records, (3) failed to pay wages when due, (4) failed to post
a Department of Labor poster, (5) filed to abide by the
terms of the working agreement and (6) fired several
workers in retaliation for the suit. The court awarded (1)
over $1,000 in statutory damages for the violations, (2)
back pay up to the minimum wage, and (3) $5,000 to three
plaintiffs for emotional distress. Martinez v. Shinn, 992
F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1993).
POULTRY INSPECTION. The plaintiff objected to a
regulation promulgated by the Food Safety and Inspection
Service governing the inspection standards required for
imported poultry products. The regulation required that the
poultry products be subject to an inspection program with
requirements “at least equal to” the U.S. program. The
plaintiff claimed that this regulation violated the Poultry
Products Inspection Act which required that imported
poultry products be subject to “the same” inspection
requirements as U.S. poultry products. The Congress had
also objected to the regulation, including in FACTA 1990
language urging the FSIS to change the regulation. The
court held that the statutory language was not ambiguous or
subject to administrative interpretation and invalidated the
regulation. Mississippi Poultry Ass’n v. Madigan, 992
F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993).
PSEUDORABIES. The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations adding the Particle Concentration Fluorescence
Immunoassay test to the list of official tests for
pseudorabies. 58 Fed. Reg. 37666 (July 13, 1993).
TOBACCO. The CCC has adopted as final the
determinations of 1993 price support levels for tobacco:
    Kind and Type                                                                                                                                                                                  Cents per pound   
Virginia fire-cured(type 21) 139.5
Ky-Tenn. fire-cured(types 22-23) 146.4
Dark air-cured(types 35-36) 125.5
Virginia sun-cured(type 37) 123.3
Cigar filler & binder(types 42-44, 53-55) 107.4
Cigar filler (type 46) 83.4
58 Fed. Reg. 36857 (July 9, 1992).
The CCC has adopted as final the determinations of
1993 marketing quotas for tobacco:
    Kind and Type                                                                                                                                                                                Million pounds  
Virginia fire-cured(type 21) 1.975
Ky-Tenn. fire-cured(types 22-23) 38.2
Dark air-cured(types 35-36) 11.16
Virginia sun-cured(type 37) 0.128
Cigar filler & binder(types 42-44, 53-55) 14.0
Cigar filler (type 46) 0
58 Fed. Reg. 36853 (July 9, 1992).
The CCC has adopted as final the determination that the
1993 marketing quota for burley tobacco is 603.0 million
pounds with the price support at 168.3 cents per pound. 58
Fed. Reg. 36857 (July 9, 1993).
WOOL . The CCC has issued proposed regulations
which establish the shorn wool support price for the 1993
marketing year at $2.04 per pound. The payment rate for
wool on unshorn lambs for 1993 is to equal 80 percent of
the difference between the national average price received
for shorn wool in 1993 and the 1993 support price,
multiplied by 5. The mohair support price for 1993 is to be
within a range of 15 percent above or below the comparable
percentage of parity at which shorn wool is supported. 58
Fed. Reg. 37876 (July 14, 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES. Much of the
decedent’s estate passed to the surviving spouse under the
terms of an inter vivos trust. The residue of the decedent’s
estate passed to the surviving spouse and the will indicated
the decedent’s intent to maximize the marital deduction.
However, the will also provided that any estate tax was to
be paid from the estate residue and not from the trust. The
court held that the estate tax was to be charged against the
residuary estate, decreasing the amount passing to the
surviving spouse and eligible for the marital deduction. Est.
of Swallen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-149.
The decedent’s will provided that any federal estate
taxes were to be paid first from the residuary estate then
from a residuary trust established from an inter vivos trust
at the decedent’s death. Because the residuary estate was
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insufficient, the remaining taxes were to be paid from the
residual trust. The IRS ruled that, although the will and
trust were ambiguous on the point, the remaining taxes
were to be apportioned under the state apportionment
statute to the property passing to the trust which created
estate tax. Ltr. Rul. 9326002, Mar. 18, 1993.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s inter vivos trust split into two trusts at the
decedent’s death, with one trust being a residual trust.
Under the decedent’s will, the administrative costs of the
estate were to be charged to the residual trust and the
trustee charged one-half of the costs to the trust income and
one-half to the trust principal. The trustee reduced the
charitable deduction for specific bequests from the trust by
the amount of costs allocated to trust principal. The IRS
ruled that the charitable deduction amount was to be
reduced by all of the administrative costs allocated to the
residual trust.  Ltr. Rul. 9326002, Mar. 18, 1993.
The decedent’s will bequeathed the residuary estate to a
trust which provided for distribution of equal shares of trust
income to two charities and three individuals. At the
termination of the trust, the charities received 5 percent and
15 percent of the trust corpus, with the three individuals
receiving 20 percent each. The IRS ruled that the income
interests to the charities were not eligible for the charitable
deduction because the interests were not for a specific
annual amount. The IRS also ruled that the interests in trust
corpus were not eligible for the charitable deduction
because the trust did not qualify as a charitable remainder
annuity trust, a charitable remainder unitrust or a pooled
income fund. The IRS also ruled that the trust could not be
reformed under I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3)(C)(ii) because the time
limit for the reformation had expired and that a state court
order reformation would not be accepted.  Ltr. Rul.
9326003, Mar. 23, 1993.
The decedent had established a trust which provided for
payment of trust income at least quarterly to an institution.
The trust provided that if the institution did not exist on the
decedent’s death, the income was to be paid to a university.
The IRS ruled that the distributions of income were eligible
for the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 93260025, April 1,
1993.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, established a
charitable remainder unitrust with the taxpayers as equal
joint beneficiaries during their joint lives and the survivor
as sole beneficiary during the survivor’s life. The
taxpayers’ two children will succeed as equal joint
beneficiaries during their joint lives with the survivor as
sole beneficiary. After these four persons, several charitable
organizations will receive the remainder of the trust corpus.
The taxpayers retained the right to change in their wills the
non-charitable remainder beneficiaries. The husband also
had the right to change the charitable beneficiaries. The IRS
ruled that the husband’s gifts to the charitable and non-
charitable beneficiaries were incomplete gifts. The wife’s
gifts to the trust were incomplete only as to the
noncharitable beneficiaries. The IRS also ruled that the
entire value of the portion of the trust attributable to the
contribution of each taxpayer will be included in each
taxpayer’s gross estate because both taxpayers had the right
to revoke the other non-charitable survivorship interests.
However, the present value, at the date of death, of the
charitable remainder interests would be eligible for the
charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9326049, April 5, 1993.
The decedent had established a revocable inter vivos
trust which provided that, upon the decedent’s death, the
trust residue passed to a charity with the provision that the
charity make specific monthly payments to two individuals
for their lifetimes. After the decedent’s death, the executor
had the trust reformed into two charitable remainder
annuity trusts to provide the monthly payments, with the
residue paid to the charity. The IRS ruled that the original
trust was reformable and the reformation was qualified to
make the trusts qualified charitable remainder annuity trusts
eligible for the charitable deduction. In addition, the residue
amount paid directly to the charity was eligible for the
charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9326056, April 7, 1993.
The decedent had established an inter vivos trust which
provided that at the death of the decedent, the trust property
was to pass in trust to organizations exempt from
inheritance tax under Indiana law. Indiana law at the time
of the decedent’s death exempted from the inheritance tax
cemetery associations which were not qualified charitable
organizations under I.R.C. § 170(c). The IRS ruled that
because the trustee had discretion to distribute a portion of
the trust income and principal to a charitable organization
not qualified under I.R.C. § 170(c), the property passing to
the trust was not eligible for the charitable deduction. The
IRS also held that the trust was not reformable. Ltr. Rul.
9327006, Mar. 31, 1993.
ELECTIONS. The IRS has revised its procedures for
granting relief under Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-1(a) for
extensions of time to file elections. Under the revised
procedures a taxpayer will not be considered to have acted
reasonably and in good faith if the taxpayer files a qualified
amended return which alters a return position which was or
could have been subject to an accuracy-related penalty.
Rev. Proc. 93-28, I.R.B. 1993-25.
LAND TRUSTS-ALM § 8.05 .* The decedent had
attempted to transfer the beneficial interest in property held
in an Illinois land trust to the decedent’s spouse without
consideration and with knowledge that the transfer would
make the decedent insolvent at a time when the decedent
also knew that the IRS had made assessments for unpaid
taxes. The court found the transfer to be fraudulent and
voidable and held that the decedent’s spouse was liable to
the IRS for payment of the proceeds of a subsequent sale of
the property, where the decedent’s spouse knew that the
transfer was an attempt to remove the property from the
reach of the IRS when the decedent was insolvent. United
States v. Brown, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,375
(N.D. Ill. 1993).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
surviving spouse was a remainder beneficiary of an inter
vivos trust established by the decedent. The decedent’s will
provided that the executor was to split the trust into a QTIP
share and a non-QTIP share with so much of the trust
property passing to the QTIP share so as to eliminate the
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estate’s federal estate tax. The trust was funded with stock
subject to a buy-sell agreement which established the
selling price at net book value. The stock was valued at net
book value on the estate tax return and the QTIP share was
calculated at a dollar amount and percentage of the trust.
An IRS audit resulted in an increase in the value of the
stock for estate tax purposes and the estate sought to
increase the QTIP share of the trust accordingly. The IRS
ruled that the QTIP election was irrevocable but that the
election amount could have been changed if the QTIP
amount had been determined on the estate tax form as a
formula calculation based upon valuation for estate tax
purposes. In addition, the QTIP election amount could not
be increased because the amount received for the stock was
limited to the net book value; the increase in valuation for
tax purposes would not cause any additional proceeds to be
received by the trust. Note: the second rational for
disallowing the change in the election amount would appear
to also disallow the adjustment even if the estate had used a
formula election. Ltr. Rul. 9327004, Feb. 25, 1993.
VALUATION. At the decedent’s death, the decedent
was involved in a suit against a securities firm for fraud.
The IRS valued the lawsuit at $2.1 million, based upon the
ultimate award of over $2 million. The court held that the
lawsuit was to be valued according to the prospects of
recovery at the date of death, given the nature of the facts
and awards in similar suits. Est. of Davis v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-115.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS
COMPENSATION. A car dealership management
corporation was allowed a deduction for compensation paid
to an officer/shareholder where the compensation was
reasonable given the shareholder’s critical role in the
corporation’s success and and was similar to compensation
paid to other corporate officers in the industry. Automotive
Investment Development, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-298.
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03.* A wholesaler of
building materials operating as a cooperative decided to
liquidate after three years of net operating losses. The losses
for the last taxable year were allocated according to the
percent of total business of members and nonmembers, with
member  losses allocated to each member based on the
percentage of patronage during the taxable year. The
expenses of liquidation were allocated in the same manner.
The IRS approved of these allocations. The cooperative
also realized gain from the sale of property and the IRS
ruled that the gain was not deductible as a patronage
dividend and could not be offset by the patronage losses
allocated to members or nonmembers. Ltr. Rul. 9326006,
Mar. 16, 1993.
INSURANCE PROCEEDS. The taxpayer’s residence
was destroyed by fire in 1989, and the taxpayer finished
rebuilding the house in 1991. In 1989, 1990, 1991 and
1992, the taxpayer received insurance proceeds for
increased living expenses. The IRS ruled that where the
taxpayer’s increase in living expenses was more than the
total amount of insurance proceeds received for increased
living expenses, none of the proceeds was included in gross
income. However, where the insurance proceeds exceeded
the actual increase in living expenses, the excess is included
in gross income as follows: (1) the insurance proceeds
received during the loss period, 1989-1991, are included in
gross income in 1991 to the extent that the proceeds
exceeded the increased living expenses, (2) if the amount of
the insurance proceeds received during the loss period does
not exceed the increase in living expenses, the amount of
insurance proceeds received in 1992 are included in gross
income in 1992 to the extent that the total insurance
proceeds for increased living expenses exceed the total
increased living expenses, and (3) if the amount of the
insurance proceeds received during the loss period exceeds
the increase in living expenses, all of the insurance
proceeds received in 1992 are included in gross income in
1992. Rev. Rul. 93-43, I.R.B. 1993-24, 54.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03*
TAX SHELTERS. A partnership was assessed penalties
under I.R.C. §§ 6700, 6701 for promotion of an abusive tax
shelter. The penalties were also assessed against individual
partners. The partnership argued that the penalties could not
be assessed against the partnership because the partnership
was not a “person” nor a taxpayer and the penalties were
assessed against the individual partners, amounting to a
double penalty. The court held that the penalties could be
assessed against a partnership and that the statute did not
prohibit assessment against the partnership and the partners.
Bailey Vaught Robertson & Co. v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,392 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
REFUNDS. The taxpayers filed for a refund. The IRS
presented a copy of the IRS transcript of the taxpayers’
account with the IRS, which showed the refund amount.
The IRS claimed that the transcript was evidence that the
refund check was promptly mailed. The taxpayers claimed
to have not received the first refund check and sought
interest on the refund amount until 30 days before the
second refund check was sent. The court held that the IRS
was not entitled to a presumption of a mailing of the first
check because the IRS presented no evidence of standard
mailing procedures to link the transcript entry with a
mailing of the check. Godfrey v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,384 (7th Cir. 1993).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c]*
STOCK BASIS. An S corporation shareholder was not
allowed to increase the basis of stock by the amount of
corporation loans personally guaranteed by the shareholder.
The shareholder’s share of corporate losses was limited to
the shareholder’s basis in the stock. Walter v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-306.
  SELF-CANCELLING INSTALLMENT NOTES-ALM
§ 6.05.*  The decedent had sold blocks of stock to the
decedent's children in exchange for 20 year notes which
were "canceled and extinguished as though paid" upon the
decedent's death.  The estate argued that the term
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“cancelled” in I.R.C. §§ 453B, 691(a)(5) did not include
installment obligations terminated by the death of the
obligee. The court held that the cancelation of the notes at
the decedent's death was a disposition of the installment
obligation and the remaining gain was realized by the
decedent’s estate and reportable on the estate’s income tax
return.    Est. of Frane v. Comm'r, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,386 (8th Cir. 1993), aff’g in part and rev’g in
part, 98 T.C. 341 (1992).
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME-ALM § 4.06[3].*
The taxpayer contracted with a lumber company to cut
timber on land owned by the lumber company. The lumber
company selected the trees to be cut and paid the taxpayer
on an hourly basis, but the company did not instruct the
taxpayer on how to cut the trees. The taxpayer did not
receive any fringe benefits such as sick pay or vacation
time. The taxpayer provided all the tools and was liable for
any collateral damage. The court held that the taxpayer was
an independent taxpayer and could report income and
expenses on Schedule C.   Walker v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-311.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
August 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.85 3.81 3.79 3.78
110% AFR 4.23 4.19 4.17 4.15
120% AFR 4.62 4.57 4.54 4.53
Mid-term
AFR 5.32 5.25 5.22 5.19
110% AFR 5.86 5.78 5.74 5.71
120% AFR 6.40 6.30 6.25 6.22
Long-term
AFR 6.36 6.26 6.21 6.18
110% AFR 7.01 6.89 6.83 6.79
120% AFR 7.65 7.51 7.44 7.40
LANDLORD AND TENANT
FRAUD. The plaintiff leased a cherry orchard from the
defendant. The lease agreement provided that the plaintiff
was to supply to the defendant the daily grade and weight
slips which were to be used for determining the rent. The
lease also provided for a procedure for the defendant to
contest the daily receipts, but the defendant did not ever use
this procedure. The defendant had alleged that the plaintiff
fraudulently misstated the grade and weight on the slips.
The court held that the plaintiff could not be held liable for
fraud because the defendant unreasonably relied on the
receipts since the defendant failed to object to the receipts
under the lease procedures. Meduri Farms, inc. v. Robert
Jahn Corp., 852 P.2d 257 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
PARTNERSHIP
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY-ALM § 7.03[1][d].*
The plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff’s son, operated a
construction business as a partnership. The plaintiff also
owned a ranch and operated the ranch with the partnership.
In order to obtain a low interest rate FmHA loan, the
plaintiff deeded the ranch to the defendant without
receiving any consideration in return. The ranch continued
to be operated under the partnership with no change in
either partner’s share of profits or expenses. The court held
that the ranch remained partnership property because the
parties did not intend to remove the ranch from the
partnership. Holmes v. Holmes, 849 P.2d 1140 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993), mod. by, 855 P.2d 1164 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
PROPERTY
DRAINAGE. The defendants constructed catfish ponds
near the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff alleged that
drainage from the ponds and blockage by the pond walls of
the natural drainage of the plaintiff’s land cause flooding of
the plaintiff’s land. The trial court had ordered the
defendants to construct a drainage ditch and allowed the
defendants to use a portion of the plaintiff’s property if the
defendants compensated the plaintiff at $1,000 per acre
used. The appellate court held that the order constituted a
taking of the plaintiff’s property without due process.
Mendoza v. Brown, 618 So.2d 24 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONVERSION. The debtor had borrowed money from
the plaintiff bank over several years and had granted the
bank security interests in the debtor’s farm equipment,
livestock and milk proceeds. The debtor sold much of the
livestock and diverted milk proceeds without making
payment on the loans. The bank sued for conversion and the
debtor counterclaimed that the bank had breached an oral
agreement to continue loaning money to the debtor to
purchase more cattle. The court held that the oral agreement
could not be enforced because it did not comply with the
statute of frauds. The debtor argued that the statute of
frauds was waived by the bank’s course of dealing in
renewing the loans for several years. The court held that the
course of dealing defense was not allowed because the loan
agreements were unambiguous in terms of duration and
renewal rights. The debtor also sought to deny recovery by
the bank, arguing that the confiscatory price defense was
applicable. The court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion to deny the confiscatory price defense because
the debtor had converted over $117,000 in collateral
without paying the proceeds on the loans. First State Bank
of Goodrich v. Oster, 500 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 1993).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
BORROWER'S RIGHTS.   The plaintiffs '
corporation’s farm had been sold at foreclosure to the
mortgagee.  The property was redeemed by a purchaser of a
junior lienor's interest in the property and the plaintiffs sued
the purchaser and lien holder for failure to offer to sell the
farm to the plaintiffs first as required by Minn. Stat. §
500.24.  The trial court found that the plaintiffs and their
wholly-owned corporation were family farmers, but the
appellate court remanded on this issue  because only the
corporation was the owner of the property and the trial
court failed to include in the record a basis for the holding
that the corporation was a family farm corporation.  The
trial court had held that although the plaintiffs were entitled
to a right of first refusal, the plaintiffs would not be allowed
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to purchase the farm at the sale price because the purchaser
had invested substantial sums in the property.  The
appellate court agreed and held that if the corporation was a
family farm corporation, it was not entitled to specific
performance of their right of first refusal because the
plaintiffs had delayed in bringing the current suit and had
led the purchaser to believe that the title issue was settled.
The court also remanded on the issue of what damages
could be recovered by the plaintiffs.  Lilyerd v. Carlson,
499 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. 1993), rem’g in part, 478 N.W.2d
534 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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DAIRY LICENSE. The plaintiff operated a dairy farm
and was licensed as a milk dealer. In 1985, the plaintiff’s
license was revoked for payments to producers below the
minimum price, failure to keep records, failure to submit
monthly reports and failure to comply with orders of the
state Milk Marketing Board. The plaintiff’s problems were
due primarily to poor management by the plaintiff’s
brother. The plaintiff continued to operate the dairy without
a license and reapplied for a license. In reviewing the
application for a 1991-1993 license, the Board noted that
compliance was expected from the plaintiff in the future but
denied the license. The court held that the plaintiff was
ultimately responsible for the mismanagement of
employees and the repeated violations and continued
disregard of the license revocations supported the denial of
the latest applications. Kobylski v. Milk Marketing Bd.,
624 A.2d 770 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and other
professionals who advise agricultural clients. The book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law Press, the
Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add $6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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